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ABSTRACT
This paper quantitatively tests the “new trade theory” based on product diﬀerentiation, increasing
returns, and imperfect competition. We employ a standard model, which allows both changes in
the distribution of income among industrialized countries, emphasized by Helpman and Krugman
(1985), and nonhomothetic preferences, emphasized by Markusen (1986), to eﬀect trade directions
and volumes. In addition, we generalize the model to allow changes in relative prices to have
large eﬀects. We test the model by calibrating it to 1990 data and then “backcasting” to 1961
to see what changes in crucial variables between 1961 and 1990 are predicted by the theory. The
results show that, although the model is capable of explaining much of the increased concentration
of trade among industrialized countries, it is not capable of explaining the enormous increase in the
ratio of trade to income. Our analysis suggests that it is policy changes, rather than the elements
emphasized in the new trade theory, that have been the most signiﬁcant determinants of the increase
in trade volume.
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This paper investigates the extent to which the “new trade theory” can quantitatively
match some of the facts that it was designed to explain. It does so by calibrating a standard
m o d e l ,b a s e do nM a r k u s e n( 1986), to 1990 data and then “backcasting” to 1961 to see what
changes in crucial variables between 1961 and 1990 are predicted by the theory.
T h en e wt r a d et h e o r y ,d e v e l o p e db yr e s e a r c h e r sl i k eH e l p m a n( 1981), Krugman (1979),
and Lancaster (1980) in the late 1970s and 1980s, was motivated by the failure of more
traditional theories to explain some of the most signiﬁcant facts about post World War II
trade data. As Deardorﬀ (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) explain, the new trade
theory was designed to account for three major facts:
• The ratio of trade to income has increased.
• Trade has become more concentrated among industrialized countries.
• Trade among industrialized countries has been largely intraindustry trade.
Figure 1 presents evidence for the ﬁrst fact, showing how much faster world trade has
increased than world income. To make comparisons easy in the ﬁgure, data on both world
trade volume, measured by summing up exports throughout the world, and world income have
been expressed as indices where 1950=100. Over the period 1950-1990, the ratio of trade to
income worldwide increases by 86.1 percent. The data for both trade and income used to
derive the indices in Figure 1 are measured in constant 1970 U.S. dollars. Alternatively, we
could look at trade as a fraction of income, dividing the current value of trade by the current
value of income. As a fraction of the value of GDP, the value of trade increased from 7.9
percent in 1950 to 15.4 percent in 1990, a 94.9 percent increase. To make the second factprecise, we identify industrialized countries with the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), which was formed in 1961. Figure 2 shows how much faster
trade within the OECD has increased than OECD trade with the rest of the world. The
ratio of OECD-OECD trade to OECD-RW trade went from 0.84 in 1961 to 1.58 in 1990.
Evidence for the third fact can be found in the high Grubel-Lloyd indices of international
trade in industrialized countries. For this sort of data it is more diﬃcult to calculate long
time series. In 1990 though, Grubel-Lloyd indices based on two-digit SITC data from the
OECD say that 68.4 percent of OECD-OECD trade was intraindustry compared with only
38.1 percent of OECD-RW trade.
Closely related to the ﬁrst two facts is yet a fourth fact: The ratio of trade to income
w i t h i nt h eO E C Di n c r e a s e de v e nf a s t e rt h a nt h er a t i oo ft r a d et oi n c o m ew o r l d w i d e . F i g u r e3
presents the relevant data. Trade within the OECD went from 5.3 percent of OECD income
in 1961 to 11.2 percent in 1990. The ratio of trade to income within the OECD increased by
111.5 percent. By comparison the United Nations data say that the ratio of trade to income
worldwide increased by only 59.3 percent over 1961-1990.
That the new trade theory was developed to explain these facts is explicit in textbook
expositions by the developers of the theory. Helpman and Krugman (1985), for example,
point out that conventional trade models like the Ricardian model and the Heckscher-Ohlin
model cannot hope to explain these facts and go on to say,
These ... empirical weaknesses of conventional trade theory ... become under-
standable once economies of scale and imperfect competition are introduced into
our analysis.
2Helpman and Krugman stress the changes in the distribution of income among industrialized
countries as a major cause of the expansion of trade relative to income. In the early post
war period the United States accounted for much of the world’s income and consumption.
As the distribution of national income became more equal, their model predicts that trade
volumes should rise.
Focusing on the increase in trade among industrialized countries, Markusen (1986)
stresses unequal income elasticity of demands that result from nonhomothetic preferences.
If demand for diﬀerentiated products is superior to that for homogeneous products, then
intraindustry trade should expand as income rises; and, if industrialized countries are net ex-
porters of these diﬀerentiated products, then intraindustry trade among industrialized coun-
tries should expand faster than other trade. As Markusen et al. (1995) point out, it was to
match the facts listed above that the theory had been formulated:
Thus, nonhomogeneous demand leads to a decrease in North-South trade and to
an increase in [intraindustry trade] among the northern industrialized countries.
These are precisely the facts there were to be explained.
Our model generalizes those developed by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Markusen
(1986) in that it allows changes in relative prices to have large eﬀects on trade volumes. Be-
cause of faster total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, the relative
prices of manufactured goods have fallen sharply from 1961 to 1990 compared to the prices
of primary goods and services.
Our numerical experiments show that, although the model can explain the increased
concentration of trade among industrialized countries, it is not capable of explaining the
3enormous increase in the ratio of trade to income. The simple fact is that it has been the
trade of manufactured goods among OECD countries that accounts for most of the expansion
of trade over the period 1961-1990. Over this same period, however, the consumption of
manufactures in these countries has gone down as a fraction of income. A model that relies
on the taste for variety approach developed by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
links increases in trade to increases in consumption. It seems that it is policy changes, rather
than the elements emphasized in the new trade theory, that have been the most signiﬁcant
determinants of the increase in trade volume.
In related literature, Hunter (1991) estimates that nonhomothetic preferences accounts
for about one fourth of observed interindustry trade. Helpman (1987) reports regression
results that he interprets as support for the Helpman-Krugman explanation of the distribution
of national income as the driving force behind trade increases. Hummels and Levinsohn
(1995), however, argue that Helpman’s results are not related to the Helpman-Krugman
theory. Haveman and Hummels (1999) argue that the new trade theory models rely on
taste for variety that is not consistent with the data and predict too much trade. Yi (1999)
argues that the new trade theory models cannot account for the increase in trade unless they
incorporate changes in both trade policy and international vertical integration.
It is worth noting that lack of data on trade in services in 1961 forces us to restrict
our attention to merchandise trade in both our data analysis and in our theory. Information
on sources for all of the data presented in this paper are included in the data appendix.
42. A “New Trade Theory” Model
Consider a world in which there are n developed countries, identiﬁed with the 23
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1990,
and a rest of the world. (There were actually 24 countries in the OECD in 1990, but, since
data for Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated together, we treat them as one country.)
Table 1
OECD in 1990
























In each country or region, there are three types of goods, a primary good that is
tradable and homogeneous, manufactured goods that are tradable and diﬀerentiated by the
ﬁrm that produces them, and a service good that is nontradable and homogeneous within the
5country where it is produced. The OECD and the rest of the world diﬀer in the endowments
of physical capital and human capital held by consumers. Speciﬁcally, the endowments of
OECD consumers are koe and hoe while those of consumers in the rest of the world are krw
and hrw.














































s ≥ 0. (2)
Here xj
p is the consumption of the primary good and qp is its price; xj
m (z) is the consumption
of the manufactured good produced by ﬁrm z and qm (z) is its price; xj
s is the consumption
of the service good and qj
s is its price; and rj is the return to physical capital while wj is the
return to human capital. Notice that, since we assume that consumers in diﬀerent OECD
countries have the same endowments koe and hoe, x1
i = x2
i = ... = xn
i = xoe
i . The parameter
ρ, 1 ≥ ρ > 0, governs the elasticity of substitution 1/(1 − ρ) between any two diﬀerentiated
manufactured goods in the interval Dw =[ 0 ,d w] of such goods produced throughout the
world; the parameters γp and γs govern the income elasticities of demand for the diﬀerent
types of goods; and the parameter η governs the elasticity of substitution between any two
types of goods, which in turn governs the price elasticities of demand for the diﬀerent types
6of goods. In the base case, where γp = γs = η =0 , all of the income elasticities and price































In the homothetic utility case, where γp = γs =0 , there is no need to keep separate track of
Nj, but in the nonhomothetic case there is.


























In contrast, the technology for producing manufactured goods exhibits increasing re-
turns to scale because of the presence of ﬁxed costs. Speciﬁcally, every ﬁrm z has the
7production function







Here F>0 are the ﬁxed costs.
The ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector are monopolistic competitors. Firm z in country
or region j sets its price qm (z) to maximize proﬁts
Π(z)=qm (z)Ym (z) − r
jKm (z) − w
jHm (z), (10)
taking all of the other prices qp, qm (z0), qj
s, rj, wj as given. To do so, the ﬁrm solves the






























































Given its choice of output, the ﬁrm chooses Km (z) and Hm (z) to minimize costs.








































j (Ym (z)+F) (17)
where A and Cj are the appropriate expressions derived from equations (11)—(14). Diﬀeren-
tiating proﬁts (15) with respect to qm (z) and setting the derivatives equal to zero yields the
familiar Lerner condition for proﬁt maximization
qm (z)=C
j / ρ. (18)
Here the price elasticity of demand for good z is 1/(1 − ρ). It is straightforward to show
that this is the same result that we ﬁnd if we assume that ﬁrms set quantities rather than
prices.
We determine the number of ﬁrms dw by allowing free entry and requiring that the





m (z)/ρ − C
jY
w
m (z) − C
jF. (19)







Definition 1. An equilibrium is a vector of prices qp, qm (z), qj









p, Ym (z), Km (z), Hm (z), Y j
s , Kj
s, Hj
s, z ∈ Dw,
j =1 ,...,n,rw, an interval of ﬁrms Dw,a n dam e a s u r eo fﬁrms for each country or region,
Dj, j =1 ,...,n,rw, such that
1. Given the prices, the individual consumption plans xj
p, xj
m (z), xj
s, solve the utility max-
imization problem of consumer j (1)—(2);
2. The factor prices rj, wj, and the production plans for the primary and service good

































3. Each manufacturing ﬁrm z in country or region j chooses price qm (z) to maximize
proﬁts (18). Given output Ym (z), it chooses inputs Km (z), Hm (z) to minimize costs;
4. Every ﬁrm z ∈ Dw earns zero proﬁts (20);
















































s ,j =1 ,...,n,rw; (25)






Km (z)dz + K
j
s = K






Hm (z)dz + H
j
s = H
j,j =1 ,...,n,rw; (27)




2 ∪ ···∪ D
n ∪ D
rw. (28)
If factor prices in the OECD and the rest of the world are equal, then all of the
manufacturing ﬁrms are faced with symmetric problems. Consequently, they all set the same
quantities and charge the same prices. Since there are 2 traded goods prices and 2 factors
of production, we know that factor prices are, in fact, equal across regions if both regions
produce both goods. This suggests a simple procedure for computing equilibrium common
in trade models: We compute an integrated equilibrium model for the world economy. We
then compute the production plan for each region. As long as both regions produce both
goods, we are done with the computation. If one of the regions were to produce negative
11amounts of one of the goods, we would be wrong to assume that factor prices were equal.
In this case we would have to go back and compute an equilibrium in which at least one of
the countries specializes. (We are not very interested in these sorts of equilibria, however,
because they do not correspond with world production patterns in 1961 and 1990.)
We solve the model for a world with two regions, the OECD and the rest of the world,
e a c ho fw h i c hi sm a d eu po fd i ﬀerent countries. To see how the theory matches up with the
data, however, it is essential that we be able to calculate intraindustry trade in manufactures
within the OECD and between the OECD and the rest of the world.
To calculate intraindustry trade, we generalize the approach developed by Helpman
and Krugman (1985). Let sj be the share of country or region j, j =1 ,...,n,rw in the























In the absence of trade barriers, the composition of consumption baskets of manufactured
goods are the same in all countries and regions. Consequently, the imports of country j from










m,j =1 ,...,n (31)
12The imports of the rest of the world from the OECD are
M
rw




To obtain total trade within the OECD, we sum the expressions for Mj
























In this section we describe the calibration of the model to a 1990 data set. We begin
by assembling a benchmark data set for the OECD in 1990. Speciﬁcally, we aggregate ﬁgures
on production and factor utilization for each of the 3 sectors in the model for the 23 countries
listed in Table 1.
Table 2
Benchmark 1990 OECD Data Set
(Million U.S. Dollars)
Primaries Manufactures Services Total
Y oe
i 668,993 3,659,294 12,141,293 16,469,580
Hoe
i 228,208 2,883,736 8,543,962 11,755,906
Koe
i 440,785 775,558 3,497,331 4,713,674
Xoe
i 861,634 3,466,653 12,141,293 16,469,580
Y oe
i − Xoe
i -192,6411 92,641 00
The 1990 OECD data set is presented in Table 2. The ﬁgures for GDP in each of
the 3 sectors are taken from OECD National Accounts. To obtain the factor inputs, we ﬁrst










j=1(LCj + FCj + OSj − UPj)
. (34)
Here LCj is the total labor compensation in country j; FCj is ﬁxed capital consump-
tion; OSj is operating surplus; and UPj is unincorporated proﬁts. What this procedure does
is to split indirect taxes and unincorporated proﬁts, which is mostly returns to self-employed
workers or family businesses, proportionally between returns to labor and returns to physical
capital. We then proportionally adjust the labor compensations for each of the 3 sectors re-
ported by OECD National Accounts so that their total yield the labor compensation implied
by relation (34). Imports of primaries by the OECD from the rest of the world are taken
from OECD Foreign Trade by Commodity. The number reported is that for net imports.
We also report results for an alternative calibration in which these imports are gross exports,
275,043 million U.S. dollars, rather than 192,641 million U.S. dollars. The results for this
alternative calibration do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those reported in the next section. Net
exports of manufacturing from the OECD to the rest of the world are set equal to imports
of primaries to insure balanced trade. Notice though that, given product diﬀerentiation in
manufacturing, the OECD both imports manufactured goods from the rest of the world and
exports manufactured goods to it. The data on consumption by sector are obtained residu-
ally. Notice that the concept of consumption in the model corresponds to consumption plus
investment plus government spending in the national income accounts.
14Population ﬁgures are taken from UN World Population Project.T h e y a r e
N
oe = 853.7,N
rw =4 ,428.3, (35)
where the units are millions of people.
Table 3
Benchmark 1990 Rest of the World Data Set
(Million U.S. Dollars)
Primaries Manufactures Services Total
Y rw
i 1,222,748 1,159,518 3,447,005 5,829,270
Xrw
i 1,030,107 1,352,159 3,447,005 5,829,270
Y rw
i − Xrw
i 192,641 -192,641 00
Total income in the rest of the world is taken from UN Yearbook of National Accounts










i =5 ,829,270. (36)
Table 3 presents a benchmark data set for the rest of the world. These numbers were also
derived from the UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics using the following method-
ology: We collect sectoral production data for any country for which such data is recorded
for a year in the period 1984-1991. We use the sectoral production shares to impute sectoral
production in 1990 by multiplying these shares by 1990 GDP. We are able to then impute
sectoral production shares for the rest of the world and multiply these shares by total output
in the rest of the world to impute sectoral outputs. The number of countries in the rest of
the world for which we have sectoral output data is 103. The GDP of these countries in 1990
15is 3,149,703 million U.S. dollars, which is 54.0 percent of total GDP in the rest of the world.
The value of ρ =0 .833333 (=1 /1.2) is chosen so that the markups charged by man-
ufacturing ﬁrms over variable costs in the Lerner condition (18) is 20 percent. This is
consistent with evidence presented by Morrison (1990). We normalize dw = 100. The choice
of any other value of dw proportionally scales up or down F, xj
m(z),X j
m(z), and Y j
m(z), but
leaves the values of all other variables unchanged.
We calibrate the model by normalizing qp = qm(z)=qs = r = w =1and then
calculating values of Krw and Hrw so that the benchmark data set is an equilibrium of the
model. In numerical experiments in which we allow for nonhomothetic preferences, we can
use the diﬀerent consumption shares in the OECD and the rest of the world to calibrate the
utility parameters γp and γp. The calibration procedure yields a rest of the world that is





because the rest of the world needs to export the capital intensive good, primaries. This
relative capital abundance is consistent with the limited data on sectoral labor shares in
the UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. It is also consistent with the evidence
presented by Treﬂer (1993).
4. Numerical Experiments
In our numerical experiments, we introduce changes in the parameters of the model
to simulate the world in 1961. The principal facts about 1961 that we incorporate into our
16model are that the world was a much poorer place than in 1990 and that the distribution of
income and consumption of manufactured goods was much more concentrated than in 1990.
Part of this concentration was reﬂected in the fact that the industrialized world, which we
assume to be the OECD, consisted of fewer countries. Our model says that these diﬀerences
will have eﬀects on the direction and volume of trade.
In 1961 the OECD consisted of the 19 countries listed in Table 4. Notice the absence
of Japan and the very large share of income generated by the United States.
Table 4
OECD in 1961




















The world was much poorer in 1961 than it was in 1990 for two reasons: ﬁrst,
endowments of factors were smaller; and, second, total factor productivities in the diﬀerent
sectors were lower. We begin with total factor productivities by rescaling the constants θi
17and the ﬁxed costs F in the production functions,
θp,1961 = θp,1990 (38)
θm,1961 = θm,1990/1.014




The yearly total factor productivity growth rates, 0, 0.014, and 0.005, are those derived by
Echevarria (1997) for the OECD.





1961 =2 ,545.0. (41)

















































The yearly growth rates used in (42) and (43), 0.030653 for the OECD and 0.025148 for
the OECD, are derived from various issues of the World Bank World Development Report.
18Unfortunately, these growth rates are calculated for real GDP data that are chained in a
complicated way, rather than based on a ﬁxed base year’s prices. An alternative is to









for example. Yet another possibility would be to take the growth data for the OECD in (42)








w h i c hs a y st h a tt h er a t i oo fO E C Dt or e s to ft h ew o r l dG D P ,a t1961 prices, should equal that
observed in the data. Results for numerical experiments with this alternative calibration are
reported in the next section. They do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those reported here.
Requirement (44), that the capital/labor ratio in the OECD stay ﬁxed has no signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on our results given the other requirements that we are imposing. Requirement
(45) says that net exports of primaries from the rest of the world to the OECD should equal
their observed value in 1961, taken in this case from GATT. As we have already explained
it is equally possible to calibrate the model to reproduce gross exports as a faction of GDP,
which were 0.081632 rather than 0.050285. The next section also presents an experiment in











19Although the results for this alternative calibration are slightly more favorable to the new
trade theory, they also imply that the rest of the world should have been a net importer of
primaries in 1961, a result drastically at odds with the data.
Table 5
Results for Base Case Calibration
19611 990 Change
Data
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.0531 0.1123 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8435 1.5786 87.1%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
1. γp =0 , γs =0 , η =0
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1070 0.1357 26.8%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8927 1.1685 30.9%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2105 0.2105 0.0%
2. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η =0
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1023 0.1322 29.2%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.7392 1.0603 43.4%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2123 0.2105 -0.8%
3. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η =0 .4372
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.0625 0.1322 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.7384 1.0603 43.6%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.1253 0.2105 68.0%
4. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η = −1.2150
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1323 0.1322 -0.1%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.7398 1.0603 43.3%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
Table 5 reports the results of some numerical experiments with our model. We focus
ﬁrst on the base line experiment in which γp =0 , γs =0 , η =0 . It is this experiment that is
the best test of the Helpman-Krugman explanation of the expansion of trade volume. Notice
that, although trade between OECD countries as a fraction of income does expand by 26.8
percent, this increase is far short of the 111.5 percent increase in the data. Notice too that
trade within the OECD increases only by 30.9 percent compared to OECD trade with the rest
of the world, rather than increasing by 87.1 percent as in the data. The Helpman-Krugman
20explanation of the increase in trade volumes, embodied in this experiment falls well short of
accounting for the facts.
Let us now focus on the experiments in which utility is nonhomothetic. Notice that,
when we calibrate the parameters γp and γs to match the consumption shares in Tables
2 and 3, setting γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, we obtain parameters that are consistent with
other evidence that it is services that have the highest income elasticity of demand, followed
by manufactures, which are in turn followed by agriculture. As we can see, Markusen’s
(1986) story does indeed go a long way in accounting for the increase in OECD-OECD trade
compared to OECD trade with the rest of the world, accounting for almost half of the observed
increase.
The next experiment, in which γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7,a n dη =0 .4372, shows that,
if we introduce price elasticities of demand that diﬀer from 1 by letting η diﬀer from 0, the
model is indeed ﬂexible enough to account for the increase of OECD-OECD trade compared
to OECD income. The value of η that we use is very high, however: Stockman and Tesar
(1995), for example, estimate η to be −1.27. Notice too that this parameterization results in
a huge increase in the share of manufactures in consumption in the OECD over the period
1961-1990 as their relative price falls because of technological progress. This huge increase
in share is very much at odds with the decline observed in the data.
The ﬁnal experiment shows that, for a reasonable value of η, η = −1.2150, the model
is capable of matching the decline in consumption share of manufactures while preserving
the explanation for the expansion of OECD-OECD trade relative to OECD trade with the
rest of the world. Notice that this experiment predicts that OECD-OECD trade should have
fallen slightly as a fraction of OECD income, a prediction drastically at odds with the data.
21The ﬁnal numerical experiment is the only one consistent with the observed diﬀerences
in the composition of output between the OECD and the rest of the world in 1990 and the
observed change in the composition of output in the OECD between 1961 and 1990. In this
numerical experiment the new trade theory fails to account for any of the increase in the
ratio of OECD-OECD trade to OECD income. The theory does, however, account for half
of the increase in ratio of OECD-OECD trade to OECD-RW trade.
Some simple calculations show why we should not have expected the new trade theory
to simultaneously account for both the sharp increase in trade over the period 1961-1990
and the decline in the importance of manufacturing in ﬁnal demand. Neglecting trade
in manufactures with the rest of the world, we can approximate OECD-OECD trade in
manufactures with the formula
Moe
oe









In the data, the index of size distribution of national incomes in the OECD, (1−
Pn
j=1(sj)2),
goes from 0.6634 in 1961 to 0.8272 in 1990, producing the increase in trade to income em-
phasized by Helpman and Krugman (19 8 5 ) . I ti sh e r et h a ta l l o w i n gt h em e m b e r s h i po ft h e
OECD to increase over time produces results favorable to the theory. The ratio of man-
ufacturing GDP to total GDP in the OECD, Xoe
m/Y oe, falls, however, from 0.2779 in 1961
to 0.2105 in 1990. Notice that these two changes almost exactly cancel each other out,
producing the prediction of no increase in the ratio of OECD-OECD trade to OECD income
trade in the ﬁnal experiment.
225. Sensitivity Analysis
This section reports the results of numerical experiments of models in which we employ
alternative calibration methodologies. First, we report the results of experiments where,
rather than calibrating the utility parameters γp and γs to match observed consumption
shares, we set them arbitrarily to γp = −200 and γs =1 6 0 0 . These parameter values
make primaries more inferior and services more superior than in our base case calibration.
One defense for this alternative speciﬁcation is that the data in Table 3, upon which our
calibration of the parameters γp and γs is based, are probably the least reliable numbers in
our benchmark data set.
Table 6
Results for Alternative Speciﬁcation of Nonhomotheticity
19611 990 Change
Data
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.0531 0.1123 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8435 1.5786 87.1%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
1. γp = −200, γs =1 6 0 0 , η =0
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.0788 0.1093 38.7%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.3263 0.6074 86.1%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2269 0.2105 -7.2%
2. γp = −200, γs =1 6 0 0 , η =0 .4170
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.05170 . 1093 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.3259 0.6074 86.9%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.1449 0.2105 45.3%
3. γp = −200, γs =1 6 0 0 , η = −0.7416
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.0957 0.1093 14.2%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.3265 0.6074 86.0%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
Notice in Table 6 that the results for both the ratio of OECD-OECD trade to income
and the ratio of OECD-OECD trade to OECD-RW trade improve signiﬁcantly. Even so, in
the third experiment, where η is calibrated to match the observed decline in the consumption
23share of manufactures, the model is only able to replicate a small fraction of the observed
increase in the ratio of OECD-OECD trade to OECD income. Nevertheless, no matter what
the value of η, Markusen’s (1986) story based on inferiority of primaries can account for the
observed increase in the ratio of OECD-OECD trade to OECD trade with the rest of the
world if utility is suﬃciently nonhomothetic.
Table 7
Results for Gross Imports Calibration
19611 990 Change
Data
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.0531 0.1123 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8435 1.5786 87.1%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2674 0.2055 -23.1%
1. γp =0 , γs =0 , η =0
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1081 0.1357 25.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.9029 1.1685 29.4%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2055 0.2055 0.0%
2. γp = −134.6, γs = 418.0, η =0
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.0994 0.1291 29.8%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.6440 0.9759 51.5%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2090 0.2055 -1.7%
3. γp = −134.6, γs = 418.0, η =0 .4440
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.06100 . 1291 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.6430 0.9759 51.8%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.1212 0.2055 69.6%
4. γp = −134.6, γs = 418.0, η = −0.9879
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1250 0.1291 3.3%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.6448 0.9759 51.3%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2674 0.2055 -23.1%
Table 7 reports the results of numerical experiments of a model in which imports
of primary goods by the OECD from the rest of the world are identiﬁed with gross exports,
rather than with net exports as in the base case calibration. Notice that, given our calibration
procedure, the fraction of income spent on manufactures in the OECD in 1990 changes from
0.2105 to 0.2055.
24Table 8 reports the results of a set of numerical experiments for the calibration in which
growth in the endowments of the rest of the world between 1961 and 1990 are calibrated to
replicate the observed ratio of OECD income to income in the rest of the world in 1961 (47),
rather than to replicate the observed growth rate (43). Similar calculations, not reported
here, show that imposing growth rates based on 1961 prices (46) do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the results.
Table 8
Results for Alternative RW Growth Calibration
19611 990 Change
Data
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.0531 0.1123 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8435 1.5786 87.1%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
1. γp =0 , γs =0 , η =0
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1094 0.1357 24.0%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.99011 .1685 18.0%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2105 0.2105 0.0%
2. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η =0
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1049 0.1322 26.0%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8182 1.0603 29.6%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2123 0.2105 -0.8%
3. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η =0 .4437
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.0625 0.1322 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8152 1.0603 30.1%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.1226 0.2105 71.7%
4. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η = −1.1907
O E C D - O E C DT r a d e/O E C DI n c o m e 0.1359 0.1322 -2.7%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8205 1.0603 29.2%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
The ﬁnal set of results reported are for numerical experiments of a model in which
endowments in the rest of the world in 1961 are required to have the same capital/labor
r a t i oa st h e yd oi n1990 (48) rather than to generate the observed exports of primaries to the
OECD (45).
25Table 9
Results for Alternative Endowment Calibration
19611 990 Change
Data
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.0531 0.1123 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8435 1.5786 87.1%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
RW Prim Exp / RW Income 0.0503 0.0330 -34.3%
1. γp =0 , γs =0 , η =0
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.1077 0.1357 26.0%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.8948 1.1685 30.6%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2105 0.2105 0.0%
RW Prim Exp / RW Income 0.0565 0.0330 -41.5%
2. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η =0
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.0920 0.1322 29.8%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.71811 .0603 47.7%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2123 0.2105 -0.8%
RW Prim Exp / RW Income -0.0407 0.0330 -
3. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η =0 .3555
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.0625 0.1322 111.5%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.7166 1.0603 48.0%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.1497 0.2105 40.6%
RW Prim Exp / RW Income -0.0497 0.0330 -
4. γp = −169.5, γs = 314.7, η = −1.2361
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD Income 0.1230 0.1322 3.3%
OECD-OECD Trade / OECD-RW Trade 0.7199 1.0603 47.3%
OECD Manf Con / OECD Income 0.2779 0.2105 -24.3%
RW Prim Exp / RW Income -0.0311 0.0330 -
Notice that this calibration results in the rest of the world importing primary goods form the
OECD in 1961.
6. Some Not So Recent Trade Facts
Although the three facts reported in the introduction do indeed characterize post
W o r l dW a rI It r a d ed a t a ,t h e yd on o tc h a r a c t e r i z ed a t ab e f o r et h e n . T h en e wt r a d et h e o r i s t s
of the 1980s may have gone too far in focusing on a limited amount of data. The historical
data cast doubt on the explanations of the facts posited by the new trade theory.
26The high rates of growth in foreign trade and the steady increase in the ratio of trade to
income observed after the 1950s, also characterized the trends in the foreign trade statistics
during the nineteenth century. In fact, as reported by Kuznets (1967), between 1800 and
1913, per capita world trade grew at an average rate of 33.0 percent per decade, whereas per
capita world income did it at an average rate of 7.3 percent. As a result, during the period,
the ratio of trade to income increased to over 11 times its initial level. Since estimates for
1913s h o wt h a tt h er a t i oo fw o r l de x p o r t st ow o r l di n c o m ew a sa b o u t17p e r c e n t ,i n1800
it must have been below 2 percent. The inter war period, however, resulted in a dramatic
reduction in trade, not only as a fraction of world income, but also in absolute terms. This
reduction was particularly intense during the Great Depression years. United Nations data
show that by 1950 the ratio of world trade to world income had fallen to less than 8 percent.
By 1990, this ratio had risen to slightly more than 15 percent, still not at the level achieved
in 1913.
Data for the United States show a similar pattern. Starting in the 1960s, as Figure
4 reports, there was a signiﬁcant increase in the ratio of trade to income but only to reach,
in 1990, a level similar to those seen during the second half of the nineteenth century. (The
data in this ﬁgure calculate trade as exports plus imports.)
Finally, looking at directions of trade, Woytinsky and Woytinsky (1955) report that
Europe dominated world trade during the nineteenth century. In 1913 the ratio of intra
European trade to world trade was 40 percent. By 1938, however, it had fall to 29 percent,
and in 1953 it was 22 percent. During the next thirty years this ratio increased steadily until
reaching 38 percent in 1990, a value similar to the one seen in 1913.
277. Intermediate Goods?
Our model does not include intermediate goods. Yet much of the increase in trade has
been in intermediate goods. (See, for example, Feenstra, 1998.) Could introducing inter-
mediate goods be a way of rescuing the new trade theory? As Figure 5 shows, in the United
States and in Mexico the utilization of intermediate goods has declined sharply over the past
20 years compared to GDP. Looking at Input-Output Matrices conﬁrms that the decline in
the importance of intermediate goods reﬂects the decline in importance of manufactures. In-
termediate goods are disproportionately used by and produced by the manufacturing sector.
In the United States in 1987, although the manufacturing sector accounted for 21.5 percent
of GDP, it accounted for 40.0 percent of the use of intermediate goods and 38.1 percent of
their production. The Mexican data are similar: In Mexico in 1985, although the manufac-
turing sector accounted for 23.4 percent of GDP, it accounted for 52.3 percent of the use of
intermediate goods and 41.7 percent of their production. Adding intermediate goods to the
models would complicate the data analysis because of the lack of comparable input-output
matrices across countries and time. It would still leave us with the same mystery in relation
t ot h en e wt r a d et h e o r y : T h eg o o d st h a ta r eb e i n gt r a d e dm o r ea n dm o r eo v e rt i m ea r et h e
same goods whose importance is falling in relationship to domestic production.
8. Policy?
The post war years have seen substantial steps towards global trade liberalization.
Could it be changes in policy rather than the features emphasized in the new trade theory
that have been responsible for the dramatic increase in the ratio of trade to income? We can
provide a preliminary answer to this question and highlight the issues at stake with a simple
28version of the new trade theory model used in this paper.
Consider a model with only one sector, the manufacturing sector, and one set of
countries that engage in international trade, the OECD. Suppose that each of the n countries
in the OECD imposes trade barriers on imports from the other countries in the form of a
uniform ad valorem tariﬀ, τ. In contrast to our earlier analysis, we assume that all of the
countries in the OECD are identical in terms of size, because trade barriers would aﬀect
countries of diﬀerent size diﬀerently. In this model, each country would produce the fraction
1/n of the world’s varieties of goods. Let Xd be the amount of each variety consumed
domestically and Xf t h ea m o u n tc o n s u m e di ne a c ho ft h en−1 foreign countries. Symmetry






Market clearing implies that
Xd +( n − 1)Xf = Y. (51)









To replicate index of size distribution of national incomes in the OECD, (1−
Pn
j=1(sj)2),
with symmetric countries where sj =1 /n, we can let the number of countries take on non
integer values. In 1961, (1 −
Pn
j=1(sj)2)=0 .6634, implying that n =2 .97. In 1990,
(1 −
Pn
j=1(sj)2)=0 .8272, implying that n =5 .79. As we have seen, however, the change
29in the size distribution of national incomes is almost exactly canceled out by the decline in
the importance of the manufacturing sector. Consequently, we ﬁx n =5 .79 and ask whether
changes in trade barriers as represented by τ can account for the more than doubling of
the ratio of trade to income. The answer to this question obviously depends on how much
trade barriers have fallen and on the elasticity of substitution between varieties, 1/(1 − ρ).
Calculations for a wide variety of parameters are presented in Figure 6. What we need is a
large fall in trade barriers, accompanied by a large elasticity of substitution. If ρ =1 /1.1,
for example, implying an elasticity of substitution of 11, a fall in τ from 0.25 to 0.05 implies
that the ratio of trade to income increases by a factor of 2.5. If ρ =1 /1.2, however, implying
an elasticity of substitution of 6, we need a larger fall in τ, say from about 0.50 to 0.05 to
produce the same sort of increase in the ratio of trade to income.
Yi (1999) argues that, since average tariﬀ rates have fallen from about 15p e r c e n ti n
19 6 0t o5p e r c e n ti n1990, incorporating policy changes into the new trade theory cannot
account for the increase in trade unless we assume very high elasticities of substitution in
varieties. He presents a model in which it is increases in international vertical integration,
induced by changes in trade policy, that account for the increase in the ratio of trade to
product. It must be pointed out, however, that Harrigan (19 9 3 )s h o w st h a te v e ni nt h e
OECD in 1983 non tariﬀ trade barriers were far higher than tariﬀ barriers, in fact more than
8 times higher. Hummels (1999) has also identiﬁed a large number of trade barriers and has
shown that their presence does a good job in accounting for observed trade patterns. To the
extent that these trade barriers have fallen signiﬁcantly, a version of the new trade model
that emphasizes trade policy seems capable of explaining large increases in the ratio of trade
to income.
30Data sources
We report the sources for all data used in the paper ordered as they are presented.
Indices of output and exports for 1950-1990 in Figure 1:
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, New York, various issues.
World exports and world GDP for 1950, 1970 and 1990:
United Nations, Trends in International Distribution of Gross World Product, Special Issue,
National Account Statistics,N e wY o r k ,1993.
Trade within the OECD and OECD trade with the rest of the world for 1961-1990
in Figures 2 and 3:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Foreign Trade by Commodities,
volumes 1 and 2, Paris, various issues.
Grubel-Lloyd indices for 1990:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Foreign Trade by Commodities,
volumes 1 and 2, Paris, 1993.
United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, New York, 1993.
GDP for each OECD country in Tables 1 and 4 and sectoral GDP and labor and
capital for the OECD in Table 2:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, National Accounts, Paris, various
issues.
Net and gross imports of primaries by the OECD from the rest of the world for
1990 in Table 2:
31Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Foreign Trade by Commodities,
volume 1,P a r i s ,1993.
Population for the OECD and the rest of the world in 1990 and 1961:
United Nations, World Population Project,N e wY o r k ,v a r i o u si s s u e s .
Aggregate and sectoral GDP for the rest of the world in 1990 in Table 3:
United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics,N e wY o r k ,1993.
I n c o m ep e rc a p i t ag r o w t hr a t e sf o rt h eO E C Da n dt h er e s to ft h ew o r l df o r
1961-1990:
World Bank, World Development Report, Washington, various issues.
Net exports of primaries from the rest of the world to the OECD in 1961:
General Agreement on Tariﬀsa n dT r a d e ,International Trade,G e n e v a ,1963.
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Annual, Washington, 1965.
Exports, imports, and GNP for the United States for 1870-1990 in Figure 4:
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970, Washington, 1975.
United Nations, National Account Statistics, Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables,N e wY o r k ,
various issues.
Historical data on world trade:
S. Kuznets, “Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: X-Levels and Struc-
ture of Foreign Trade: Long-term Trends,” Economic Development and Cultural Change,
Part II, 1967.
32United Nations, Trends in International Distribution of Gross World Product, Special Issue,
National Account Statistics,N e wY o r k ,1993.
Historical data on trade within Europe:
W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Commerce and Governments: Trends and
Outlook, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1955.
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington, various
issues.
Intermediate inputs and GDP in the United States and Mexico in Figure 5:
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geograﬁa e Informática, Anuario Estadístico de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, Aquascalientes, various issues.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Improved Estimates of Gross
Product by Industry 1947-98,” Survey of Current Business, 81 (2000). The data are available
on the Bureau’s website, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea.
Input-output matrices for the United States and Mexico:
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geograﬁa e Informática, Matriz de Insumo Producto Ac-
tualizada a 1985,M e x i c o ,D .F . ,1990.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Input-Output Accounts of the
U.S. Economy, 1987,” Survey of Current Business, 74 (1994). The data are available on the
Bureau’s website, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea.
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Figure 6: World Trade / World Income
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